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AN OLD CRIME IN A NEW CONTEXT: MARYLAND’S NEED 
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CYBERSTALKING STATUTE 
 
Christie Chung* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Department of Justice defines stalking as a “pattern of 
repeated and unwanted attention, harassment, contact, or any other 
course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person to feel fear.”1 Unlike a multitude of other crimes, 
stalking is unique in that it is a composite offense made up of a pattern 
of, oftentimes, varied behaviors.
2
 These behaviors include, but are by 
no means limited to: direct and indirect threats of harm, following or 
lying in wait for the victim at their home, place of work, and other 
frequented locales, and sending unwanted gifts and items.
3
 
 
Although the first anti-stalking statute was not passed until 
1990, rapid technological advances in the intervening decades have 
entirely redefined the scope of the offense.
4
 As a “borderless medium” 
that provides a veneer of anonymity, the internet has proven to be a 
fertile landscape of new opportunity for those looking to stalk, harass, 
or otherwise attack others.
5
 Cyberstalking, as a subset of computer-
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1
 Stalking, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ovw/stalking (last updated 
Jan. 6, 2016). 
2
 See id. Stalking can be defined as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person 
that involves repeated visual or physical proximity, nonconsensual communication, 
or verbal, written or implied threats, or a combination thereof, that would cause a 
reasonable person fear.” PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. JUST., 
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., STALKING IN AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 2 (Apr. 1998), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf. See also infra Part III.B. 
3
 Stalking, supra note 1 (linking to Stalking Resource Center, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/stalking-resource-center 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017)). 
4
 See Naomi H. Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 127, 129 (2007). 
5
 Id. at 129.  
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related crimes, occurs when perpetrators utilize information 
technology infrastructures (i.e. cyberspace) to carry out the 
conventions of physical stalking.
6
  
 
This Comment maintains that the current state of Maryland’s 
criminal law leaves cyberstalking victims with questionable and 
uncertain means of recourse. In establishing a body of law that befits 
the seriousness of cyberstalking as a potential precursor to violent 
crime, the State should create a statute tailored to the crime of 
cyberstalking instead of relying on traditional stalking and harassment 
laws that do not work in the cyber context. Specifically, the 
formulated law needs to articulate clear actus reus and mens rea 
standards that adequately balance free speech concerns with the needs 
and experiences of victims.
7
 
 
Part I of this Comment provides a profile of the victims against 
whom cyberstalking is often perpetrated.
8
 This examination of the 
victims provides a central framework through which subsequent 
discussion of the crime and reform measures should be situated. Part II 
of this Comment differentiates cyberstalking from traditional stalking 
and assesses how these differences inform the process of investigating, 
prosecuting, and convicting offenders.
9
 Part III and Part IV 
contemplate the sufficiency of current federal and Maryland statutes, 
respectively.
10
 Finally, Part V addresses the identified deficiencies in 
existent statutes and submits a draft cyberstalking statute for adoption 
in the state of Maryland.
11
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See generally Marlisse S. Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do About 
Online Harassment, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/what-the-law-can-and-cant-
do-about-online-harassment/382638 (exploring the dark side of cyberspace and the 
variety of interpersonal communications that take place therein). 
7
 See infra Part V.C.  
8
 See infra Part I. 
9
 See infra Part II. 
10
 See infra Part III–IV. 
11
 See infra Part V. 
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I. CONTEXTUALIZING CYBERSTALKING THROUGH THE PRISM OF 
VICTIM EXPERIENCES 
 
Although stalking is a gender-neutral crime in that both men 
and women are victimized, the majority of victims are 
disproportionately female.
12
 Unsurprisingly, this gendered dimension 
of traditional stalking has carried over into virtual perpetration of the 
crime.
13
 Working to Halt Online Abuse, a nonprofit organization 
founded in 1997, reported that 72.5 percent of their incident reports 
between 2000 and 2007 originated from women.
14
 Moreover, women 
are not only more likely to be stalked online, the harassment they 
encounter is more likely to be gender-based.
15
 That is, while men are 
more likely to be called “offensive names,” or be “purposefully 
embarrassed,” the harassment women face online often stems from the 
fact that they are women, and is more likely to be sexual in nature.
16
 
Without a doubt, men and women are both subjected to harassment 
online;
17
 however, acknowledgement of how the harassment differs 
                                                 
12
 SHANNAN CATALANO, STALKING VICTIMS IN THE UNITED STATES–REVISED, 
OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1 (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svus_rev.pdf. In a study of 220,995,170 
individuals over a 12-month period, 2.2% of females experienced stalking as 
compared to 0.8% of males. Id. at 4. 
13
 See Soraya Chemaly, 12 Examples: Pew’s Online Harassment Survey Highlights 
Digital Gender Safety, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-
chemaly/pew-online-harassment-survey_b_6028350.html (last updated Dec. 22, 
2014) (“Women are much more likely to experiencing [sic] stalking, sexual 
harassment and sustained harassment online.”); see also Amanda Hess, Why Women 
Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 6, 2014), 
https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-internet-
aa21fdbc8d6#.u9qphnlna. According to a 2006 study conducted by the University of 
Maryland, “[a]ccounts with feminine usernames incurred an average of 100 sexually 
explicit or threatening messages a day. Masculine names received 3.7.” Id. 
14
 Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 32 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2010); Working to Halt Online Abuse, http://www.haltabuse.org 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017).  
15
 See Chemaly, supra note 13 (arguing that women not only experience more severe 
forms of cyber harassment, but that the harassment stems from a deeply rooted 
culture of misogyny).  
16
 See id. (commenting on the quality and nature of harassment that men are more 
likely to endure online as compared to women). 
17
 See id. (“Researchers found that 40 percent of Internet users report experiencing 
some form of online “harassment,” defined in the study as name-calling, purposeful 
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both in form and in how it is experienced by victims will be crucial for 
effective legislative reform.
18
 
 
In exploring the contours of cyberstalking by looking to its 
victims, it is necessary to situate cyberstalking within the context of 
intimate partner violence (IPV).
19
 The prevalence of stalking in 
abusive relationships is well documented.
20
 Seventy-six percent of 
women murdered by their intimate partners experienced a period of 
stalking prior to their deaths.
21
 Similar to physical stalking, it is 
difficult to determine with absolute certainty the prevalence of 
cyberstalking because of underreporting.
22
 That being said, in a 2009 
victimization survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
twenty-six percent of stalking victims indicated that their stalkers’ 
pattern of conduct involved the use of technology in one form or 
another.
23
 Notwithstanding the fact that this figure is probably, in 
actuality, much higher,
24
 the number of stalking victims reporting the 
use of technology is likely only to increase in the coming years as 
technology continues to transform the spheres of social interaction.
25
    
   
 Society has immeasurably benefitted from modern 
technological advances, yet cyberspace has proven to be a regrettably 
fertile landscape for stalkers and abusers.
26
 IPV relationships go 
                                                                                                                   
embarrassment, stalking, sexual harassment, physical threats and sustained 
harassment.”). 
18
 Goodno, supra note 4, at 128–33 (stating five different ways in which 
cyberstalking differs from traditional, physical stalking that must be taken into 
account for legislative reform).  
19
 See Andrew King-Ries, Teens, Technology, and Cyberstalking: The Domestic 
Violence Wave of the Future?, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131, 133 (2011). 
20
 See id. at 136 (commenting on “the centrality of stalking to the domestic violence 
relationship and the connection between stalking and risk of physical violence.”). 
21
 Id. 
22
 Donna M. Schwartz-Watts, Commentary: Stalking Risk Profile, 34 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 455, 455 (2006) (“Stalking remains underreported. Only one half to 
one third of stalking victims reported such crimes.”); Michael L. Pittaro, Cyber 
Stalking: An Analysis of Online Harassment and Intimidation, 1 INT’L J. CYBER 
CRIM. 180, 182 (2007) (explaining how cyberstalking contributes to the “dark 
figure” of crime due to rampant underreporting and under-detection).  
23
 King-Ries, supra note 19, at 133. 
24
 Schwartz-Watts, supra note 22, at 455. 
25
 See Pittaro, supra note 22, at 181. 
26
 See Aily Shimizu, Comment, Recent Developments: Domestic Violence in the 
Digital Age: Towards the Creation of a Comprehensive Cyberstalking Statute, 28 
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beyond the physical component of violence; authorities characterize 
IPV as defined by patterns of abuse that are centrally geared towards 
the elimination of personal autonomy and the establishment and 
maintenance of control.
27
 In looking at the common methods of 
abusers—“physical and emotional isolation, repeatedly invading the 
victim’s privacy, supervising the victim’s behavior, terminating 
support from family or friends, threatening violence toward the victim, 
threatening suicide”—it becomes abundantly clear that the internet 
presents new avenues of convenience and opportunity.
28
 The 
following two excerpts illustrate the societal costs borne by the advent 
and commercialization of new technologies:  
 
A Wisconsin article reported that a woman found it 
impossible to escape her ex-boyfriend. He would follow 
her as she drove to work or ran errands. He would 
inexplicably pull up next to her at stoplights and once 
tried to run her off the highway…. The article reported 
that the stalker put a global positioning tracking device 
between the radiator and grill of the survivor’s car.29 
 
In September 2001, a Michigan man was charged with 
installing spy software on the computer of his estranged 
wife. He installed a commercially available software 
program on her computer at her separate residence. 
Without her knowledge, the program sent him regular 
emails reporting all computer activity, including all 
emails sent and received and all Web sites visited.
30
  
 
Looking at both the strong correlation between stalking and violence, 
and the ways in which stalkers are increasingly exploiting 
                                                                                                                   
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 116, 117–18 (2013) (describing the general 
environment of the internet as favorable to stalkers due to the anonymity and 
freedom from geographic constraints that it confers). 
27
 King-Ries, supra note 19, at 135 (stating “[w]hile violence is a critical component 
of the relationship, the broader power and control dynamic prevails: ‘The battering 
relationship is not about conflict between two people; rather, it is about one person 
exercising power and control over the other.’”). 
28
 Id.; see also infra Part III. 
29
 Cynthia Southworth et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Technology, and Stalking, 
13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842, 847 (2007). 
30
 Id. at 848.  
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technological channels to interject themselves into the lives of their 
victims, Maryland’s lack of a dedicated cyberstalking statute is an 
oversight that undermines the State’s ability to ensure the safety and 
well-being of all its citizens.
31
 
 
II. USING ELECTRONIC MEDIUMS IN PLACE OF OR IN ADDITION TO 
PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE—CYBERSTALKING 
 
The differences between physical stalking and stalking as 
perpetrated through electronic mediums leaves victims of 
cyberstalking in a precarious position. In addition to facing many of 
the same challenges encountered by victims of traditional stalking, 
victims of cyberstalking must confront the unique problems posed by 
cyber-based crimes.
32
 Along with the consequences of potentially 
having their personal information compromised, victims of 
cyberstalking must develop strategies for addressing preservation of 
digital evidence, law enforcement minimalization of their sustained 
harms, and increased offender capabilities.
33
 
 
A. Successful Prosecution of Cyberstalking is Frustrated by 
the Heavy Evidentiary Burden Carried by Victims and the 
Tendency to Trivialize Incidents of Cyberstalking  
  
 Victims of cyberstalking are hamstrung by the same obstacles 
that hinder the successful prosecution and conviction of conventional 
stalkers, but to a greater degree.
34
 For one, stalking is one of a handful 
of crimes wherein the responsibility of investigation and data 
collection flows to victims rather than law enforcement.
35
 In the 
absence of physical evidence or witnesses who can corroborate a 
                                                 
31
 See infra Part IV.   
32
 See generally KRISTIN FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CYBERCRIME: 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 1, CONG. RES. 
SERV. (2015) (outlining the complex economic, safety, and legal issues posed by 
“twenty-first century criminals”—that is, those who utilize the digital world to 
victimize). 
33
 See infra Part II.A.–B. 
34
 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STALKING AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 41 (1998). 
35
 See ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY 380 
(9th ed. 2016) (noting that the onus is on stalking victims to collect and document 
evidence of their victimization). 
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victim’s allegations, it is often difficult to differentiate between 
“whether the contact was an act of stalking or an unintentional 
encounter.”36 Consequently, in many cases, “the burden of proof is so 
high that very few stalkers are found guilty.”37 In terms of 
cyberstalking, digital evidence presents its own unique set of 
challenges. As a repository of a tremendous amount of information, 
personal computers, the internet, and technology in general have 
rapidly become an indispensable investigative tool for victims and law 
enforcement alike.
38
 Be it archiving incriminating e-mails or 
screenshotting threatening social media posts, victims may find it 
easier to preserve the evidence they need to build a case.
39
 The 
problem with reliance on digital evidence stems not from its existence, 
however, but from its fragility and issues of accessibility.
40
 The digital 
trail left by online activity is of little use if it is encrypted beyond 
recognition or remotely wiped before it can be processed.
41
 Moreover, 
technical proficiency in activities such as encryption or hacking is no 
longer a limiting factor.
42
 The ever-growing “services-based nature of 
cybercrime” allows stalkers lacking technological proficiency to 
nevertheless achieve their ends by purchasing the skills and services of 
others who do possess the requisite degree of technical expertise.
43
 
                                                 
36
 See supra note 34. 
37
 KARMEN, supra note 35. 
38
 See SEAN E. GOODISON ET AL., DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE U.S. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, NAT’L INST. JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2015), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf (detailing how technological 
advances have caused major shifts in law enforcement methods for criminal 
investigations). 
39
 Id. at 4.  
40
 Id. at 7 (“Modern electronic devices…can also be fragile. As a result, digital 
evidence can be damaged or altered by basic actions, such as dropping an item in 
water, passing a powerful magnet by it, or even through sheer physical force to break 
components”). 
41
 Id. at 4 (noting the value of encrypting data to prevent others from accessing the 
content of communications between users).   
42
 See RAJ SAMANI & FRANÇOIS PAGET, CYBERCRIME EXPOSED: CYBERCRIME-AS-A-
SERVICE, MCAFEE 1, 4 (2013), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-
papers/wp-cybercrime-exposed.pdf (investigating the burgeoning underground 
market of services and products available for purchase or rent by potential 
cybercriminals).  
43
 Id. at 4–5 (identifying the following four categories of services available to willing 
buyers: research (described as the sale of information concerning system 
vulnerabilities), crimeware (described as the “toolset” or hardware needed to conceal 
malware and launch attacks), cybercrime infrastructure (described as the platforms 
 
Chung  
124  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:1 
  
 As an aggregate crime, cyberstalking is difficult to regulate in 
the absence of overt misconduct on the part of the stalker.
44
 In 
isolation, a variety of stalking behaviors may ostensibly appear 
insignificant or innocuous.
45
 Taken in the aggregate and in the context 
of IPV, however, individual stalking incidents can be viewed as 
benchmarks of a rapidly escalating encounter between the victim and 
the perpetrator.
46
 To the great detriment of cyberstalking victims, 
stalking behaviors carried out online appear particularly prone to being 
mischaracterized or trivialized.
47
 Citing a study conducted by the 
University of Bedfordshire in which “over 60 percent of survey 
participants reported receiving no help from police regarding their 
cyber harassment complaints,” University of Maryland Law professor 
Danielle Citron associates high rates of underreporting to the fact that 
“[v]ictims are uncertain as to whether [cyberstalking/harassment] is a 
crime or fear the police would not take them seriously.”48 The creation 
of a separate cyberstalking statute and its codification in Maryland’s 
criminal law will not only provide guidance to law enforcement 
officers, but it will also legitimize the injuries sustained by victims as 
real and tangible harms.  
  
B. The Internet has Fundamentally Transformed the Crime of 
Stalking—From the Identity of its Perpetrators and their 
Methodologies to the Harms Inflicted on Victims  
  
 Before turning to a discussion of the current state of federal 
and state cyberstalking laws, it is necessary to consider the scope of 
the crime. Generally, conventional stalking requires the stalker to be in 
                                                                                                                   
used to host attacks), and hacking (described as password cracking and personal 
information acquiring services)).  
44
 See John B. Major, Note, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A 
First Amendment Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 126 
(explaining how regulation of cyberstalking is difficult given the fact that it may 
include acts which appear innocuous to outside observers). Stalking is less about 
individual actions taken against a victim and more about the cumulative harm 
inflicted. See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2.  
45
 Major, supra note 44, at 126–27. 
46
 Id.  
47
 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 84 (2014) (associating 
the trivialization of online harassment with institutional deficiencies in the training 
and education of law enforcement officers). 
48
 Id. at 21. 
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relatively close physical proximity to the victim.
49
 In contrast, 
geographic boundaries are rendered irrelevant with cyberstalking as 
the internet provides offenders with a cheap and effective means of 
making direct contact with their victims.
50
 Cyberspace also exposes 
individuals to an almost immeasurable number of potential stalkers.
51
 
In the current age of social media, we freely broadcast the intimate 
minutiae of our daily lives in a way that we would never do when 
confronted with strangers in the real world. The National Crime 
Victimization Survey reports that the vast majority (69.9%) of 
conventional stalkers were either intimate partners or otherwise 
acquainted with their victims.
52
 However, when it comes to 
cyberstalking, research suggests that a far greater percentage of 
perpetrators are strangers to the victim.
53
 Victims may find their 
ability to meet evidentiary burdens further frustrated and fears 
compounded by this anonymous facet of online interactions.
54
   
 
 Perpetrators will find that they are limited only by their 
imaginations in utilizing technology to harass and surveil. Common 
techniques employed by cyberstalkers include sending unsolicited 
hateful, obscene, or otherwise threatening e-mails en masse, posting 
personal or fictitious information about the victim, impersonating the 
victim, and soliciting the participation of third parties.
55
 Individuals 
                                                 
49
 See Shimizu, supra note 26, at 117–18 (commenting on how geographic 
boundaries are a nonfactor in the commission of cyberstalking). 
50
 Id. 
51
 For example, Twitter has 313 million active daily users. COMPANY, 
https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). Facebook surpassed 
one billion users in 2015. Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/videos/vb.20531316728/10154009776186729/
?type=2&theater. 
52
 CATALANO, supra note 12, at 5. 
53
 BONNIE S. FISHER & JOHN J. SLOAN, CAMPUS CRIME: LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 247 (3rd ed. 2013).  
54
 See Adrienne Lafrance, When Will the Internet be Safe for Women?, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/when-will-the-internet-be-
safe-for-women/483473. Congresswoman Katherine Clark, who has been a victim of 
pernicious cyber harassment because of her legislative efforts to reform 
cyberstalking and harassment laws, explains, “You do internalize it, and even though 
it is not someone directly in front of you, there is something about the anonymous 
nature of it—when you don’t know where a threat is coming from—that really gets 
into someone’s psyche.” Id. 
55
 Sweeney, supra note 6. 
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will need to adopt an increasingly proactive approach to cybersecurity 
as “[d]atabases of personal information available on the Internet can 
enable a stalker to trace a victim’s…real name, address, telephone 
number, and other personal information.”56 In the first successful 
conviction of an offender under a state’s cyberstalking law, a 
California man was convicted after he impersonated his victim in 
various chat rooms and solicited others to visit the victim at her house 
to act out so-called “rape fantasies.”57 On at least six different 
occasions, men appeared at the victim’s house—sometimes in the 
middle of the night—and offered to rape her.58 The disturbing facts of 
this case are not unique, and in a number of other cases, have resulted 
in the rape and violent assault of women.
59
   
 
 In many ways, modern technology has completely 
revolutionized the capabilities of stalkers.
60
 With global positioning 
systems (GPS), spyware software,
61
 keystroke loggers,
62
 and hidden 
                                                 
56
 TRUDY M. GREGORIE, CYBERSTALKING: DANGERS ON THE INFORMATION 
SUPERHIGHWAY, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 3 (2001), 
http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/cyberstalking---dangers-on-the-information-
superhighway.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 See Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 60 Years for Craigslist 
Rape Plot, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-
marine-jebidiah-james-stipe-gets-60-years-for-craigslist-rape-plot (discussing a case 
in which a man posed as his ex-girlfriend on Craigslist, which led to her being raped 
at gunpoint); see also Sarah Larimer, Woman Uses Craigslist “Rape Fantasy” Ads 
to Target Her Ex’s Wife, Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/20/woman-uses-
craigslist-rape-fantasy-ads-to-target-her-exs-wife-authorities-
say/?utm_term=.aabe9c4fd178 (discussing a case in which a woman posed as her 
husband’s ex-girlfriend on Craigslist, causing the ex-girlfriend to be physically 
attacked in her home). 
60
 See supra text accompanying note 26.  
61
 See Viruses, Spyware, and Malware, MIT INFO. SYS. TECH., 
https://ist.mit.edu/security/malware (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (defining spyware as 
“[s]oftware that surreptitiously gathers information and transmits it to interested 
parties. Information gathered includes visited websites, browser/system information, 
and your computer’s IP address.”).  
62
 See Mary O. Foley, How to Avoid Dangerous Keyloggers, NORTON, 
https://us.norton.com/yoursecurityresource/detail.jsp?aid=key_loggers (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2017). Keystroke loggers, or keyloggers, track every key that is depressed 
on a computer or laptop’s keyboard. Id. Typically used to capture sensitive 
information such as passwords, social security numbers, or bank accounts, 
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cameras, stalkers can monitor the real time movements of their 
victims, track all computer activities, and harvest sensitive information 
such as passwords and PIN numbers at their leisure and in the 
convenience of their own homes.
63
 Similar to victims of other 
cybercrimes, it is difficult for victims of cyberstalking to even detect 
when offenders compromise their devices, privacy, and safety.
64
 One 
example of the burgeoning risk posed by cybercriminals is Luis 
Mijangos, who was arrested in 2010 after the FBI discovered him 
using malicious software to hack into the computers of more than 200 
victims.
65
 Mijangos listened to the victims through their computer 
microphones and watched them through their webcams.
66
 Of the 
victims, forty-four were juveniles.
67
 Had Mijangos not begun 
blackmailing female victims with stolen sexually explicit photographs, 
many of these breaches would have surely remained unknown to the 
victims and law enforcement.
68
 
 
From the identity of perpetrators down to the harms being 
inflicted on victims, advances in technology have entirely transformed 
                                                                                                                   
keyloggers can be transmitted as software programs or physically installed as 
hardware on computers. Id. 
63
 Southworth et al., supra note 29, at 848–49. 
64
 ADJUSTING THE LENS ON ECONOMIC CRIME: PREPARATION BRINGS OPPORTUNITY 
BACK INTO FOCUS 8, GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME SURVEY 2016, PWC (2016), 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-
survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf (commenting on issues of 
detection and the trend of organizations not realizing that their networks have been 
compromised for extended periods of time––1 in 10 economic crimes were 
discovered entirely by accident.). See also Nate Anderson, Meet the Men Who Spy 
on Women Through Their Webcams (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/webcam-spying (explaining how remote 
administration software gives hackers autonomous control over the computers of 
their victims).   
65
 Richard Winton, “Sextortion”: 6 Years for O.C. Hacker Who Victimized Women, 
Girls, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011, 1:42 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/09/sextortion-six-years-for-oc-hacker-
who-forced-women-to-give-up-naked-pics-.html. 
66
 Id.  
67
 Id.  
68
 Id. Mijangos threatened to post the intimate images and videos he found unless his 
female victims recorded and sent pornographic videos and images to him. Id. After 
one victim showed the treats to a friend, Mijangos posted nude photos of the victim 
to her Myspace page. See id.  
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the nature of stalking.
69
 While legislative reform has attempted to keep 
pace with technological innovation, the continuously changing 
boundaries between cyberspace and the physical world present 
difficult challenges to the formulation of adequate law.
70
 
 
III. AMBIGUITIES IN FEDERAL CYBER LAWS LEAD TO INEQUALITIES 
IN THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENDERS 
  
In Computer Crimes, authors Fehr, LiCalzi, and Oates note that 
“states are often the leaders in the effort to address issues 
of…cyberstalking.”71 Such must be the case in Maryland because 
existent gaps in federal law handicap the ability of cyberstalking 
victims to obtain justice.  
 
A. Conflicting Interpretations of the Interstate 
Communications Act Fosters Differential Access to Justice 
for Cyberstalking Victims  
  
 One of the key federal statutes that cyberstalking could fall 
under is 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the Interstate Communications Act.
72
 The 
statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) states that, “Whoever 
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication 
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the 
person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.”73 To secure a conviction under § 
875(c), the government must successfully prove the following three 
elements: “(1) a transmission in interstate [or foreign] commerce; (2) a 
communication containing a threat; and (3) the threat must be to injure 
[or kidnap] the person of another.”74 With regards to cyberstalking, the 
first and third factor do not tend to present much issue. The second 
factor however raises serious issues stemming from the fact that 
“threat” is a term that can be subject to several constructions.  
  
                                                 
69
 See supra notes 47–54,60–63 and accompanying text.  
70
 See infra Part III. 
71
 Caroline Fehr et al., Computer Crimes, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 977, 1018 (2016). 
72
 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
73
 Id. 
74
 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1494 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United 
States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
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 The First Amendment protection of free speech does not 
extend to communications that convey a “true threat.”75 True threats 
are taken to mean “statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence.”76 In large part, internet communications pose 
particular First Amendment issues because the intent of users is not 
easily discernible.
77
 Discrepancies in how various circuit courts have 
determined the presence or absence of mens rea have led to inequities 
in the remedies available to victims of cyberstalking.
78
 Under an 
objective standard, the mens rea inquiry looks to whether a reasonable 
person receiving the threat would believe that it was a threat.
79
 Courts 
that apply a more subjective standard for mens rea instead focus on 
whether a “reasonable speaker would foresee that the listener would 
interpret the speech as a threat of violence.”80 Differences in opinion 
as to the mens rea requirement are of tremendous importance because 
the standard that is applied also affects the defenses that will be 
available to defendants.
81
 While a defendant’s ability to show that he 
did not intend for the communication to be threatening may be 
determinative under a subjective standard, it would carry no weight in 
a jurisdiction that follows the objective standard.
82
   
  
 The facts of United States v. Alkhabaz are illustrative of how § 
875(c)’s utility to victims of cyberstalking will fluctuate depending on 
                                                 
75
 United States v. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969). 
76
 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2002). 
77
 See generally Alison J. Best, Note, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold 
Individual Rights to Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True Threats, 
75 MD. L. REV. 1127 (2016). 
78
 See Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1225, 1235–48 (2006) (surveying the differences in how lower courts have 
interpreted the mens rea requirement for determinations of “true threats”). In Elonis 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015), the Supreme Court held that § 875(c) 
must contain a mens rea requirement although the statute itself does not address 
criminal intent; ambiguities persist, however, because the Supreme Court ultimately 
declined to explicitly define the degree of mens rea needed for a conviction under 
the statute. Best, supra note 77, at 1157.  
79
 Amy E. McCann, Comment, Are Courts Taking Internet Threats Seriously 
Enough? An Analysis of True Threats Transmitted Over the Internet, as Interpreted 
in United States v. Carmichael, 26 PACE L. REV. 523, 527–28 (2006). 
80
 Id. at 528. 
81
 Crane, supra note 78, at 1236. 
82
 Id. 
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the jurisdiction and the particular court’s interpretation of the statute’s 
requirements. From November 1994 until approximately February 
1995, the defendant in the case expressed his desire to harm women in 
a series of extremely sadistic e-mails with another person whom he 
met online.
83
 The following e-mails from Alkhabaz are representative 
of the general nature of their communications:  
 
I highly agree with the type of woman you like to 
hurt…. I want to do it to a really young girl first. !3[sic] 
or 14…. There [sic] innocence makes them so much 
more fun--and they’ll be easier to control.84  
 
I can’t wait to see you in person. I’ve been trying to 
think of secluded spots. but [sic] my area knowledge of 
Ann Arbor is mostly limited to the campus. I don’t 
want any blood in my room, though I have come up 
with an excellent method to abduct a bitch __ As I said 
before, my room is right across from the girl’s 
bathroom. Wiat[sic] until late at night. grab [sic] her 
when she goes to unlock the door. Knock her 
unconscious. and [sic] put her into one of those portable 
lockers (forget the word for it). or [sic] even a duffle 
bag. Then hurry her out to the car and take her 
away…85  
 
Just thinking about it anymore doesn’t do the trick … I 
need TO DO IT.
86
 
 
Alrighty [sic] then. If not next week. or [sic] in January. 
then [sic] definitely sometime in the Summer [sic].
87
  
 
                                                 
83
  United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997). Going by the 
name Arthur Gonda, the true identity and whereabouts of the person with whom 
Alkhabaz communicated remain unknown. Id.  
84
 Id. at 1499 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
85
 Id. at 1500 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).  
86
 Id. at 1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
87
 Id. Alkhabaz’s e-mail was in response to a message from Gonda exclaiming, “My 
feelings exactly! We have to get together…I will give you more details as soon as I 
find out my situation….” Id. 
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Prior to these communications, Alkhabaz had also posted a number of 
fictitious stories online that “generally involved the abduction, rape, 
torture, mutilation, and murder of women and young girls.”88 In one of 
these stories, the victim shared the same name as one of Alkhabaz’s 
classmates at the University of Michigan.
89
 
  
 Proclaiming to use an objective mens rea standard, the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that the communications did not constitute a threat 
because a reasonable person would not have taken the statements as “a 
serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.”90 The court 
further read into § 875(c) a requirement that the government show 
actus reus by proving that Alkhabaz sent the e-mails for the express 
purpose of “effect[ing] some change or achiev[ing] some goal through 
intimidation.”91 Short of actually being assaulted or worse, victims 
will be hard pressed to meet their evidentiary burden in the Sixth 
Circuit if Alkhabaz’s discussion of specific plans, a time frame, and 
even his own pronouncement that “just thinking about it anymore 
doesn’t do the trick”92 was not enough to show an intention to “effect 
some change or achieve some goal.”93 The Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 875(c) imposed an unworkable burden on victims. 
 
B. 18 U.S.C § 2261A(2) is Insufficiently Broad to Account for the 
Various Channels Through Which Cyberstalkers Reach Their 
Victims 
 
 In 2006, Congress amended the Federal Interstate Stalking 
Punishment and Prevention Act,
94
 originally passed as part of the 
                                                 
88
 Id. at 1493 (stating that the stories were posted to the Usenet newsgroup 
“alt.sex.stories”); see also What is Usenet?, USENET.ORG, http://www.usenet.org 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (describing newsgroups as the functional equivalent of 
modern discussion forums). 
89
 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.  
90
 Id. at 1496.  
91
 Id. at 1495. 
92
 Id. at 1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
93
 Id. at 1496 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). Not until 2017 did the Sixth Circuit 
demonstrate a greater willingness to consider context when interpreting § 875(c)’s 
mens rea requirement. See United States v. Houston, No. 16-5007, 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5249, at *9, *11 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2017) (viewing the defendant’s statements 
“in context,” the court found that “a reasonable jury” could infer from the 
defendant’s tone of voice an intent to cause the victim serious injury). 
94
 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).  
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Violence Against Women Act of 1994, to specifically address 
cyberstalking.
95
 Prior to the 2006 amendments, § 2261 was limited to 
actors who “with the intent to kill or injure” used the “mail or any 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of 
conduct that places” another in reasonable fear of death or serious 
bodily harm.
96
 In 2006, Congress broadened the scope of the statute to 
read in relevant part:  
 
“Whoever— 
(2) with the intent (A) to kill, injure, harass, . . . uses 
the mail, any interactive computer service, or any 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a 
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional 
distress to that person . . . shall be punished as provided 
in Section 2261(b). (emphasis added)”97 
 
Although Congress’ revision of the Federal Interstate Stalking and 
Punishment and Prevention Act to account for cyberstalking is 
commendable, the statute’s utility is still limited..  
 
In United States v. Cassidy,
98
 the District Court for the District 
of Maryland found § 2261A(2)(A) to be unconstitutional as applied to 
a defendant who used Twitter and blog postings to harass the 
prominent leader of a Buddhist sect in Poolesville, Maryland.
99
 
Cassidy served as the Sect’s Chief Operating Officer for two weeks 
before he left following a confrontation in which it was revealed that 
he had misrepresented his qualifications.
100
 In the months following 
his departure, Cassidy took to blog postings and Twitter to harass the 
                                                 
95
 United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Md. 2011) (“Finally, the 
2006 changes expanded the mechanisms of injury to add use of an “interactive 
computer service” to the existing list which already included use of mail or any 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce”). 
96
 Id. at 580. 
97
 Id. at 580–81. 
98
 Id. at 588. 
99
 Id. at 576–80. 
100
 Id. at 578. Contrary to the Sect’s teachings, Cassidy was allegedly an ardent 
gossiper, lied about his lineage as a tulka, and falsely claimed to have had stage IV 
lung cancer. Id. 
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Sect.
101
 The Sect maintained that “all but a few hundred of the alleged 
8,000 Tweets” pertained to the church.102  
 
Ultimately, the court’s determination that § 2261A(2)(A) was 
unconstitutional as applied to Cassidy turned on First Amendment free 
speech protections.
103
 According to the court, while “the government 
has a strong and legitimate interest in preventing the harassment of 
individuals,” it was questionable whether the same interest extended to 
comments and communications initiated online.
104
 Asserting that e-
mails and phone calls were “targeted towards a particular victim 
and…received outside a public forum,” the court found no compelling 
government interest in protecting individuals from the content of 
Tweets or blogs.
105
 Crucial to its holding, the court stated that users 
have “the ability to ‘turn off’ (“block” or “unfollow”) 
communications” and that the victim of Cassidy’s defamations “had 
the ability to protect her ‘own sensibilities simply by averting’ her 
eyes from the Defendant’s Blog.”106 The court also found the fact that 
the victim was “easily identifiable [as a] public figure” to be 
significant in that “the fundamental importance of the free flow of 
ideas and opinions on matters of public concern is the core of the First 
Amendment Protections.”107  
 
The court’s rationale is inimical with the realities of what 
cyberstalking victims face. The conclusion that a victim can avoid 
harm simply by “averting her eyes” is an invidious misconception that 
diminishes the gravity of cyberstalking as a serious crime with 
serious—sometimes, tragic— real world consequences.108 In 
                                                 
101
 Id. at 578–80. 
102
 Id. The Tweets—sent by at least ten different Twitter handles all registered to 
Cassidy—included threats such as “want it to all be over soon sweetie?” and “Got a 
wonderful Pearl Harbor Day surprise for [plaintiff]…. wait for it.” Id. at 588.  
103
 Shimizu, supra note 26, at 126–27. 
104
 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (quoting Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 
(4th Cir. 1988)). 
105
 Id. at 585–86. 
106
 Id. at 578, 585 (quoting United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000)). 
107
 Id. at 586 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)).  
108
 See Black, supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Chris Wright, What 
Happened Last Fall on This Tiny New Hampshire Street Triggered a National 
Debate on Internet Crime. But Was the Web Really to Blame for the Death of Amy 
Boyer?, BOS. PHOENIX (Aug. 10, 2000), 
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California’s first conviction under its cyberstalking law, the victim did 
not even own a computer; yet, the fact that she never saw the 
defendant’s messages made neither the terror she felt nor the men who 
accosted her at her home any less real.
109
 The Maryland court’s 
proffered “avert your eyes” solution is just as inappropriate and 
ineffective in the cyber context as it would be in any case involving a 
victim of conventional stalking.
110
 Moreover, the Maryland court’s 
distinction between harassment directed towards specific individuals 
and harassment directed towards “public figures” is anachronistic in 
the modern age of social media.
111
 The court cited the fact that the 
victim had 17,221 followers on Twitter and over 143,000 views on her 
videos as support for finding her to be a “public figure.”112 Does a 
person’s affinity for updating their social media channels transform 
them into a public figure? What of the individual whose video 
abruptly “goes viral” and amasses millions of views? In a day and age 
where anyone can be “YouTube famous”113 or “Instagram famous,”114 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/08/10/MURDER.html (reporting 
on the death of Amy Boyer, a twenty-year-old college student, who was murdered 
after being unknowingly cyberstalked for two and a half years. Her murderer, who 
was able to purchase her Social Security number and address for a little more than 
$150 online, chronicled his activities on a public website over the two and a half 
years he stalked her—“It’s [actually] [obscene] what you can find out about a person 
on the internet,” he once wrote. Id.).  
109
 GREGORIE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3; Joanna L. Mishler, 
Comment, Cyberstalking: Can Communication Via the Internet Constitute a 
Credible Threat and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable If It Does?, 17 
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (2001) (claiming the victim wrote the 
following message, “Tell me you have a package, and when I open my door, attack 
me. Tie me, gag me, rip off my clothes and go for it. I’ll struggle a little just for the 
fun of it….”).  
110
 See Myths and Facts About Stalking, U. WIS. OSHKOSH, 
http://www.uwosh.edu/couns_center/campus-victim-advocate/stalking/myths-and-
facts-about-stalking (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (dispelling the myth that stalkers can 
or should be ignored by explaining that “[t]he fact [that] there has been no danger up 
until now does not mean it won’t come…even if the stalker has not made [] an 
overtly dangerous statement, any words or behaviors that indicate an unwillingness 
to let go…is a red flag.”). 
111
 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 586.  
112
 Id. at 586 n.14.  
113
 See generally Gaby Dunn, Get Rich or Die Vlogging: The Sad Economics of 
Internet Fame, FUSION (Dec. 14, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
http://fusion.net/story/244545/famous-and-broke-on-youtube-instagram-social-
media (contemplating how platforms such as YouTube and Instagram have led to the 
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the court’s rationale in Cassidy potentially precludes from § 
2261A(2)(A)’s protection a segment of the population that is arguably 
at a heightened risk of cyberstalking and harassment.  
 
IV. EXISTENT STATE STATUTES CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO 
ADDRESS THE HARMS INFLICTED BY CYBERSTALKING 
 
 In Maryland, there are three primary statutes under which the 
state may bring criminal charges against a person engaged in 
cyberstalking.
115
 All three laws are inadequate and ill-suited to address 
the crime of stalking when it occurs through electronic mediums.  
 
A. Maryland’s Traditional Stalking and Harassment Statutes 
are Ill-Fitting as Applied to Cybercrimes  
  
 Maryland’s dedicated stalking statute, Crim. Law § 3-802, 
defines stalking as “a malicious course of conduct that includes 
approaching or pursuing another.”116 The major issue with prosecuting 
a cyberstalking incident under § 3-802 is that the phrasing of the 
statute could be read to require a degree of physical pursuit.
117
 Under 
this construction, cyberstalking would fall outside of the statute’s 
purview. In Hackley v. State,
118
 Maryland’s intermediate appellate 
court held that physical pursuit is a necessary element of the offense. 
Granting certiorari, the Court of Appeals later reversed the lower 
court’s ruling and held that the statute includes physical pursuit, but 
does not explicitly require stalkers to approach their victims.
119
 
Although the Court of Appeals’ holding is encouraging, it remains 
largely inconclusive whether the entire range of activities that 
                                                                                                                   
popularization of web personalities and an increase in the number of individuals 
pursuing internet fame). 
114
 Id.  
115
 See supra Part IV.A. 
116
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-802(a) (LexisNexis 2012).  
117
 Hackley v. State, 866 A.2d 906, 912 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (the defendant 
maintained that § 3-802 required a stalker to act “in the victim’s presence and with 
the victim’s awareness.”). 
118
 Hackley v. State, 885 A.2d 816, 817 (Md. 2005).  
119
 Id. (“[W]e believe that the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued the statute and 
shall hold that the crime of stalking does not require that the defendant approach or 
pursue his victim”).  
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constitute cyberstalking would fall within the scope of § 3-802.
120
 The 
defendant’s conduct in this case conformed closely to the conventions 
of traditional stalking and the court heavily relied on the defendant’s 
real world, physical actions against the victim to determine his 
culpability.
121
 In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Court of 
Appeals specifically cited the fact that he physically assaulted the 
victim, repeatedly visited her house and left letters under the 
windshield wiper of her car, and approached her multiple times in the 
early morning.
122
 Hackley opens the door for a possible conviction of 
cyberstalking under the stalking statute, but—because of the facts of 
the case—is a poor metric of § 3-802’s viability in the cyberstalking 
context.  
 
Crim. Law § 3-803, Maryland’s harassment statute, is another 
law under which prosecutors could potentially bring criminal charges 
for cyberstalking. The statute, last amended in 2011, is inadequate in 
much the same way the stalking statute is when applied to 
cyberstalking.
123
 Both statutes are not specifically geared towards 
cyberstalking and do not account for the complexities of stalking 
behaviors carried out online. Specifically, § 3-803 is problematic 
because it requires the perpetrator to receive a “reasonable warning or 
request to stop by or on behalf of the other.”124 This requirement poses 
an undue burden on victims who are either unaware of their stalker’s 
online activities or who are otherwise unable to identify and contact 
their stalker because of the anonymity that the Internet confers.
125
 
Moreover, the statue is ambiguous as to what exactly “receipt” of a 
reasonable warning entails. That is, it is unclear whether a victim must 
prove that their stalker actually viewed the request, or whether 
evidence that a request was sent would suffice.  
                                                 
120
 See Brian Frosh & Kathleen Dumais, Bill Targets “Rape by Proxy”, BALT. SUN 
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-02-03/news/bs-ed-internet-
sexual-assaults-20140203_1_victim-prince-george-jilted-lover (citing a Prince 
George’s County case where more than 50 men accosted a woman and her children 
at home after her ex-husband posted ad requests such as “Rape Me and My 
Daughters,” Maryland Attorney General Brian Frosh explained that “prosecutors 
were forced to cobble together a lengthy list of charges to accumulate a sentence that 
would fit this novel crime.”).  
121
 Hackley, 885 A.2d at 822. 
122
 Id.  
123
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2011). 
124
 Id. § 3-803(2). 
125
 See supra Part II.B.  
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B. Maryland’s Misuse of Electronic Mail Act Suffers from the 
Same Limitations that Render the State’s Harassment Statute 
Ineffective  
  
 Maryland’s Misuse of Electronic Mail Act, § 3-805, is perhaps 
the state’s primary vehicle for prosecution of a cyberstalker.126 Unlike 
the stalking and harassment statutes, § 3-805 explicitly prohibits the 
use of “electronic communication” to “maliciously engage in a course 
of conduct…[that] harass[es], alarm[s], or annoy[s] the other.”127 
Although the state’s enactment of this measure is laudable, its utility to 
victims of cyberstalking is critically undermined by the inclusion of § 
3-803’s qualification that the offender must receive “a reasonable 
warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the other.”128 Indeed, the 
term “electronic communication” is limited only to “the transmission 
of information, data, or a communication…that is sent to a person and 
that is received by the person” (emphasis added).129 Because of this, 
the statute discounts a variety of behaviors such as when stalkers enlist 
third parties to help effectuate their goals
130
 or when blogs and web 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter are used to make defamatory posts 
that are either unknown to a victim or not specifically directed at a 
victim.
131
  
 
Furthermore, § 3-805 is puzzling in that “conduct that inflicts 
serious emotional distress” falls within its scope of prohibited 
behaviors only when the conduct is directed towards a minor.
132
 The 
increased scope of prohibited computer activities under § 3-
805(b)(1)(2) is apt in that minors are a vulnerable subset of the 
population to whom the State should afford special consideration.
133
 
                                                 
126
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2016). 
127
 Id. § 3-805(b)(1)(i). 
128
 Id. § 3-805(b)(1)(ii).  
129
 Id. § 3-805(a)(1)(2).  
130
 See Black, supra note 59. 
131
 See Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 579 n.6 (categorizing a number of the defendant’s 
Tweets as not necessarily directed towards the plaintiff). 
132
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805(b)(1)(2).  
133
 See generally Charisse L. Nixon, Current Perspectives: The Impact of 
Cyberbullying on Adolescent Health, 5 ADOLESCENT HEALTH, MED., THERAPEUTICS 
143, 144 (2014) (correlating cyberbullying with the onset of depressive 
symptomology such as feelings of “sadness, hopelessness, and powerlessness” 
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However, emotional distress is no less serious or injurious when 
inflicted on adult victims of cyberstalking.
134
 Emotional distress, 
impaired psychological well-being, and decline in cognitive health are 
some of the most well-documented harms that result from stalking.
135
 
The state’s prohibition of “conduct that inflicts serious emotional 
distress”—but only as applied to minors—shows a fundamental lack 
of understanding as to one of the basic components of stalking.
136
  
 
V. JUSTICE FOR MARYLAND CYBERSTALKING VICTIMS STARTS 
WITH ADOPTION OF A STATUTE THAT FITS THE CRIME  
   
 As of November 2016, only six states have adopted separate 
laws that expressly target cyberstalking.
137
 Of these states, three—
Illinois, Rhode Island, and Washington—have laws that address 
solicitation of third party participants, and are thus likely to be 
expansive enough to encompass the range of activities that constitute 
cyberstalking.
138
  
                                                                                                                   
among adolescents); see also Maia Szalavitz, The Tragic Case of Amanda Todd, 
TIME (Oct. 16, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/10/16/the-tragic-case-of-
amanda-todd (chronicling the events that led to fifteen year-old Amanda Todd’s 
suicide after an online predator cyberstalked and blackmailed her with sexually 
explicit photographs that he manipulated her into providing when Todd was just 
twelve years old). 
134
 See Goodno, supra note 4, at 128 (discussing how stalking may cause “post-
traumatic stress disorder, depression and serious emotional distress” in victims). 
135
 Lynne Roberts, Jurisdictional and Definitional Concerns with Computer-
Mediated Interpersonal Crimes: An Analysis on Cyber Stalking, 2 INT’L J. CYBER 
CRIMINOLOGY 271, 273 (2008) (noting that “[t]he ongoing experience of 
vulnerability may create more psychological distress than an actual physical 
assault”). 
136
 See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 607, 609 (2015) (distinguishing stalking, bullying, and harassment as 
fundamentally “criminal infliction of emotional distress” crimes; that is, crimes for 
which the law “imposes liability for causing another person emotional harm.”).  
137
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–7.5 (2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2010); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2003 & SUPP. 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 
(West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9.61.260 (2004).  
138
 See 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (“Whoever transmits any communication by 
computer or other electronic device to any person or causes any person to be 
contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her family is guilty” 
…(emphasis added)); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (“A person is 
guilty of cyberstalking if he or she, with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or 
embarrass any other person, and under circumstances not constituting telephone 
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In formulating its own cyberstalking law, Maryland should 
look to these states for guidance, but also be progressive in addressing 
the ambiguities that make prosecuting and convicting offenders at the 
federal
139
 and state level difficult.
140
 Ultimately, the success of a 
prospective cyberstalking statute will hinge on the State’s ability to 
articulate clear standards of actus reus and mens rea that (1) are 
expansive enough to cover the range of activities that occur in 
cyberspace,
141
 and (2) do not unfairly prejudice victims.
142
 
 
A. An Actus Reus Standard that is Broad Enough to Account 
for the Variety of Behaviors that Could Constitute 
Cyberstalking 
  
 Engaging in a “malicious course of conduct” that puts another 
in “reasonable fear of serious bodily injury” is the critical actus reus 
requirement of Maryland’s current stalking statute.143 As for the actus 
reus requirement of a prospective cyberstalking statute, engagement in 
a “course of conduct” should also be the essential physical act needed 
to establish criminal liability.
144
 As Naomi Goodno points out in 
Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current 
State and Federal Laws, “punishing merely one instance of harassing 
conduct may unjustly penalize one who acts once out of anger, versus 
one who engages in a series of terrifying acts.”145 Generally, it is 
difficult to quantify exactly when certain actions lose their 
independence and become recognized as part of a “course” of 
behavior.
146
 With respect to cyberstalking, however, “course of 
                                                                                                                   
harassment, makes an electronic communication to such other person or a third 
party” (emphasis added)). 
139
 See supra Part III.  
140
 See supra Part IV.  
141
 See infra Part V.A.  
142
 See infra Part V.B.  
143
 Hackley, 885 A.2d at 820.  
144
 See Shimizu, supra note 26, at 117. By its definition, stalking requires a course of 
conduct; singular incidents or occurrences do not qualify. Id.  
145
 Goodno, supra note 4, at 134.  
146
 RICHARD CARD, CARD, CROSS, AND JONES: CRIMINAL LAW 217 (21st ed. 2014) 
(“It is not simply a matter of counting the number of incidents. There must be a 
sufficient connection between the acts in type and context as to justify the conclusion 
that they amount to a course of conduct.”). Nor can course of conduct be 
presupposed by looking at timeframes—sending an email or message every year on 
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conduct” must be taken to mean two or more occasions.147 A more 
stringent definition that uses any number other than two as the 
baseline for establishing a pattern would only challenge offenders to 
inflict the greatest degree of harm in the least number of incidents 
possible.
148
   
  
 The actus reus component of a cyberstalking statute must also 
be expansive enough reflect the complexities of stalking crimes. A key 
shortcoming of Maryland’s traditional stalking law is that “a malicious 
course of conduct” is defined only as behaviors that place another in 
reasonable fear of “serious bodily injury,” “an assault in any degree,” 
“rape or sexual offense,” “false imprisonment,” or “death.”149 
Stalking, especially in the context of domestic violence, is about more 
than just explicit threats of violence; it is a crime of power and 
control.
150
 The means through which offenders undermine the 
autonomy of their victims, and the type of harms inflicted are many 
and varied.
151
 Consequently, Maryland’s cyberstalking statute must 
broadly cover online conduct that inflicts not only physical injury, but 
also psychological and emotional distress—conduct that threatens not 
just the safety of victims, but also the safety of loved ones.
152
 
  
                                                                                                                   
a particular date and calling three separate times in rapid succession are examples of 
behaviors that take place on drastically different time lines, but may nevertheless 
both amount to a course of conduct. Id.  
147
 The federal stalking statute and some states use two as the minimum number of 
incidents required to establish a course of conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2266 (2012) (“The 
term ‘course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose.”); see also D.C. CODE § 22-3132 (2009) (“‘To 
engage in a course of conduct’ means directly or indirectly, or through one or more 
third persons, in person or by any means, on 2 or more occasions”.).  
148
 See discussion infra Part V.B. Just as setting two as the baseline in traditional 
stalking statutes does not cast an overly broad net, it is a similarly appropriate 
minimum as applied to cyberstalking statutes. Those who innocuously or accidently 
perform an act that constitutes cyberstalking more than once will remain shielded 
due to absence of mens rea.  
149
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–802(a)(1).  
150
 See Major, supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
151
 Roberts, supra note 135, at 273.  
152
 See KATRINA BAUM ET AL., STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 
OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (2009) (“The fears and emotional 
distress that stalking engenders are many and varied…. About 4 in 10 stalkers 
threatened the victim or the victim’s family, friends, co-workers, or family pet.”).  
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 Finally, regarding Maryland’s harassment statute, the 
requirement that a person must receive “a reasonable warning or 
request to stop,” before the conduct becomes criminal is impractical as 
applied to cyber-based crimes.
153
 As discussed, in many cases, victims 
are not aware of their stalker’s online activities, or if they are aware, 
they may not be able to identify their stalkers sufficiently to issue a 
warning.
154
   
 
B. A Standard of Mens Rea that Allows for Proper 
Identification of “Credible Threats” in Cyberspace  
  
 The mens rea element of cyberstalking should be an objective 
standard that looks to whether a reasonable person “would take the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily 
harm.”155 The alternative, a subjective standard that instead looks to 
whether a reasonable person “would foresee that the listener would 
interpret the speech as a threat of violence” places too arduous a 
burden on the government and victim.
156
 Under the subjective 
standard, a defendant who places a victim in reasonable fear of serious 
bodily injury or death will go unpunished if the government cannot 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant understood the 
communication to be threatening.
157
 Under ordinary circumstances, 
this burden of proof is exceedingly difficult to satisfy.
158
 In the context 
of electronic communications, it would be nearly impossible because 
cues such as tone of voice, facial expression, and demeanor are 
unavailable in cyberspace. Consequently, defendants could always 
allege that a comment was made in jest or simply misinterpreted by 
the victim.
159
  
                                                 
153
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-803(a)(2). 
154
 See supra notes 53–54, 63–68 and accompanying text.  
155
 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494 (internal citation omitted).  
156
 McCann, supra note 79, at 528.  
157
 Vikram D. Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Supreme Court to Consider When 
Threats Can Be Punished Consistent with the First Amendment, JUSTIA (Oct. 10, 
2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/10/10/supreme-court-consider-threats-can-
punished-consistent-first-amendment. 
158
 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (defining “beyond reasonable 
doubt” as “a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused”).  
159
 See NANCY WILLARD, EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO CYBERBULLYING AND 
CYBERTHREATS 3, CTR. SAFE & RESPONSIBLE USE OF THE INTERNET (2007), 
https://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Other-Resources/School-
Safety/Safe-and-Supportive-Learning/Anti-Harassment-Intimidation-and-Bullying-
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 An objective determination of whether or not an individual 
intended to inflict harm is the appropriate standard because “like an 
offline stalker, a cyberstalker should have to ‘intentionally’ engage in 
conduct that causes his target to fear for her safety” in order to be held 
criminally liable.
160
 However, it is also important to consider that, in 
many cases of cyberstalking, the victim knows the offender and is 
likely to have had some sort of relationship with him.
161
 In the context 
of cyberstalking as part of domestic violence, the objective standard 
should be flexible enough to acknowledge that not all threats are 
blatantly obvious.
162
 Comments and actions of the offender must be 
situated in the context of the relationship between the offender and 
victim.
163
 An assessment of this nature that looks to the totality of the 
circumstances is consistent with an objective standard of mens rea.
164
 
Similar to how courts assess an officer’s determination of probable 
cause,
165
 a court should consider whether a reasonable person in the 
                                                                                                                   
Resource/Educator-s-Guide-Cyber-Safety.pdf.aspx (discussing the difficulty and 
ambiguity of interpreting communications in cyberspace).  
160
 Goodno, supra note 4, at 134. Inclusion of this intent requirement is crucial—in 
2016, the Illinois Appellate Court held that both Illinois’ general stalking and 
cyberstalking statutes were “facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment,” for lack of a mens rea standard, i.e., that a person must 
actually intend to inflict emotional distress. People v. Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489, 
495–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). As of April 7, 2017, the case is still pending after the 
Illinois Supreme Court granted the State’s appeal as a matter of right. DAVID 
BERGSCHNEIDER, SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ISSUES PENDING IN THE 
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT 3, OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER (2017), 
https://www.illinois.gov/osad/Publications/Documents/pend.pdf.  
161
 See Fisher & Sloan, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“When 
specifically examining perpetrators who are known to the victim, the most common 
victim/offender relationships were friends/former friends (25.4%), boyfriends/ex-
boyfriends (12.1%) . . .”).  
162
 See Major, supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
163
 See supra notes 19–31 and accompanying text.  
164
 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494 (internal citation omitted). 
165
 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (noting that an officer’s 
determination of probable cause “must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement.”); see also Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable 
Lay Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1496 (2010) (“Although the issuing magistrate is the 
one who must draw conclusions, the perspective of the reasonable officer is central 
to the inquiry.”). 
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victim’s place “would take the statement as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm.”166 
 
 
C. A Proposed Amendment to Maryland’s Criminal Code  
 
This Comment proposes an amendment of Maryland’s criminal 
statutes to incorporate the following cyberstalking legislation. 
Borrowing judiciously and generously from the language of Illinois 
and Washington’s cyberstalking statutes,167 the proposal is broad 
enough to sufficiently address the multifaceted nature of 
cyberstalking. The prescribed mens rea and actus reus requirements 
are formulated to minimize any chilling effect on First Amendment 
protections:  
 
A person shall be found guilty of the crime of cyberstalking 
if:  
(a) He or she—with the intent to harass, intimidate, 
coerce, threaten, embarrass, or torment—uses a 
form of electronic communication on at least two 
separate occasions in a manner that would cause a 
reasonable person to: 
(1) Fear for his or her own safety, or the safety of 
another person, or 
(2) Suffer serious psychological or emotional 
distress.  
 
When committed as part of a course of conduct, proscribed 
activities include, but are not limited to:  
(a) The use of any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or 
obscene words, images, or language, or suggesting 
the commission of any lewd or lascivious act;
168
  
(b) Threats of assault, sexual or otherwise, directed at a 
person’s self, their property, or any member of their 
family or household 
                                                 
166
 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494 (citation omitted). 
167
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5, invalidated by People v. Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260. 
168
 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(a). 
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(c) Solicitation of third parties to commit an act in 
violation of any provision of this code 
 
For the purposes of this Section:  
“Course of conduct” shall be taken to mean a pattern of 
conduct composed of two or more acts that is without 
legitimate reason and evidences a unity of purpose.  
 
“Electronic communication” shall be taken to mean the 
transmission of information by wire, radio, optical 
cable, electromagnetic technology, or any other similar 
means. This includes, but is not limited to, e-mail, 
social media platforms, websites, pager service, text 
messaging, voice mail, and other internet-based 
channels of communication.
169
 
 
“Reasonable person” shall be taken to mean a person in 
the victim’s circumstances, with the victim’s 
knowledge of the defendant, with the victim’s 
knowledge of the defendant’s prior acts, and within the 
context of the victim’s relationship with the defendant.  
 
 “Third parties” shall be taken to mean any person other 
than the person violating these provisions and the 
victim or persons towards whom the violator’s actions 
are directed.
170
 A person who solicits a third party to 
violate the provisions of this Section will be found 
guilty of cyberstalking just as surely as if the person 
committed the act him or herself. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 California passed the first stalking statute in 1990.
171
 By 1993, 
almost all 50 states and the District of Columbia had amended their 
                                                 
169
 Adapted from WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(5).  
170
 Adapted from 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–7.5(C)(7), invalidated by People v. 
Relerford, 56 N.E. 3d (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
171
 Christine B. Gregson, Comment, California’s Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal 
Role of Intent, 28 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 221 n.2 (1998) (enacting the nation’s 
first anti-stalking statute, California was the first state to criminalize the repeated 
 
Chung 
2017]   CYBERSTALKING  145 
 
 
penal codes with some form of anti-stalking legislation.
172
 This 
process through which society recognizes and responds to deviant 
behaviors through legislative reform is fundamental to the preservation 
of law and order. The reality that we must confront is that 
technological innovation has drastically expanded the scope of 
stalking victimizations.
173
 Without parallel development in laws, 
stalkers who utilize electronic mediums to achieve their ends will 
continue to fall through gaps in federal and state statutory schemes.
174
 
Instead of amending traditional stalking laws in ways that ultimately 
prove to only be half measures,
175
 separate and distinct cyberstalking 
statutes are needed that can be properly scoped to reflect the realities 
of modern society.   
 
                                                                                                                   
following or harassment of another person “with the intent to place that person in 
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family”). 
172
 Shonah Jefferson & Richard Shafritz, A Survey of Cyberstalking Legislation, 32 
U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 323, 326–27 (2001).  
173
 See supra Part II.B.  
174
 See supra Part III–IV.  
175
 See discussion supra Part III.B.  
